University of Massachusetts Amherst

Department of Resource Economics
Working Paper No. 2005-8
http://www.umass.edu/resec/workingpapers

Heterogeneity and Common Pool
Resources: Collective Management of
Forests in Himachal Pradesh, India
Sirisha C. Naidu1
Abstract:
In the past two decades, theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that communities
of resource users are capable of overcoming social dilemmas, and are capable of
creating and sustaining institutions designed to prevent degradation of common pool
natural resources. However, there is incomplete understanding of what motivates this
group-level behavior and why some communities are better adept at solving collective
action problems than others. This paper specifically explores the role of group
heterogeneity in collective action among forest communities in the northwestern
Himalayas. Heterogeneity can have important social and ecological consequences and
understanding both its nature and effects can help in neutralizing the negative and
enhancing the positive. Based on data from 54 forest communities in Himachal Pradesh,
India, this paper finds that heterogeneity has at least three dimensions: wealth, identity
and interest, and each may significantly affect collective actions related to natural
resource management. However, their effects are far from simple and linear.
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Abstract:
This paper explores the role of group heterogeneity in collective action among forest
communities in northwestern Himalayas. Based on data from 54 forest communities in
Himachal Pradesh, India, this paper finds that heterogeneity has at least three dimensions:
wealth, social identity and interest in the resource, and each may significantly affect
collective actions related to natural resource management. However, their effects are far
from simple and linear. The empirical results suggest that cooperation need not depend
on caste parochialism, that very high levels of wealth heterogeneity can reduce
cooperation, and that there can be a divergence between ability and incentive to cooperate
which reduces the level of cooperation in the community.
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1. Introduction

In dealing with the 'tragedy of the commons', the common solutions promote state
or market involvement. However, the state-market solution to social dilemmas fails to
recognize that individuals in a group or community interact with each other to make
mutually advantageous decisions afforded to them by social institutions i.e., often they
act as a group rather than as individuals and hence neither require the state nor market to
increase social welfare.
This is evident in the case of common pool resources (CPRs), which are nonexcludable and rival and share properties of both public and private goods2. CPRs are
often characterized by externalities and incomplete or costly contracting, and hence are
prone to both market and state failures. The management of such resources therefore is
likely to succeed when they are embedded in social networks. These social networks can
be used to negotiate, bargain, and acquire dispersed information to monitor, retaliate and
impose penalties (Bowles and Gintis, 2002).
In the last two decades, theoretical and empirical work by Acheson (1988),
Baland and Platteau (1996), Berkes (1985), Chhetri and Pandey (1992), Ostrom (1990)
and Wade (1988) have brought communities to the forefront of discussions of the social
dilemmas associated with natural resources. They have argued and demonstrated that
communities are capable of avoiding the 'tragedy of the commons' by creating and
sustaining institutions to prevent degradation of natural resources. However, there is an
incomplete understanding of what motivates this group-level behavior: why are some
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See McCay (1996) for a typology on goods and resources based on their characteristics, property rights
and management regimes.
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communities better adept at solving collective action problems than others? This question
has produced literature “regarding the importance or insignificance of some variables and
how best to specify key relationships” (Ostrom, 1990).
In contributing to the discussion, this paper focuses on heterogeneity and its effect
on collective management of forests. But heterogeneity is not unidimensional and hence
three aspects are particularly dealt with - wealth, social identity, and interests. Wealth is
interpreted as ability to contribute to collective action, interests reflect the incentives to
contribute whereas social identity indicates the social cohesiveness of the community. In
order to empirically investigate the effects of heterogeneity on cooperation, data were
collected from 54 forest communities in western Himalayas in northern India. Instead of
aggregating individual behavior, the paper focuses on the effects of group characteristics
and institutions on aggregate outcomes. It complements theoretical modeling and the
case-study approach typical in the literature on CPRs.
The paper is divided into six sections. The next section discusses the complexities
of heterogeneity. It briefly reviews the treatment of heterogeneity in the literature, which
primarily restricts itself to discussions of wealth and social identity. This section argues
that the concepts of wealth and interest in cooperation are interchangeably used even
though it may not always coincide. It suggests therefore that heterogeneity in both
variables may affect cooperation differently. Section three contains a description of the
54 forest communities from which data were collected, section four discusses the
empirical model, and the proxies used for the theoretical variables and section five
reports the results. The paper concludes with a discussion of the results.
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2. Complexities of Heterogeneity

Hechter (1990) postulates that in a group, cooperation3 is determined by the extent of
member obligations and the degree of compliance with these obligations; the former
depends positively on the cost of producing the common good and the degree of
members’ interdependence, while the latter depends positively upon the monitoring and
sanctioning capabilities of the group. Moreover, frequent and multifaceted social
interaction among members contribute to the level of trust, generosity and otherregarding behaviors among group members and these govern both member obligations as
well as monitoring and sanctioning within the group.
However, it is common for natural resources to be managed along cleavages of
ethnicity, gender, religion, wealth, caste (Agrawal and Gibson, 1999) and interest in the
resource (Marwell and Oliver, 1993). As a result the cost of cooperating may vary over
individuals within the group. At the individual level, it affects incentives to contribute,
uncertainty about preferences of others and the degree of interdependence between
members. At the group level it may affect communication, monitoring and and
enforcement of rules (Schlager and Bloomquist, 1996). This makes agreement on benefit
and cost sharing, and prevention of free riding behavior difficult. Hence, the assumption
of a homogeneous group or community is not realistic4.
Heterogeneity

in

social

identity

negatively

affect

cooperation

under

discriminatory and exclusionary norms. (Agarwal, 2001; Agrawal, 1999). Social
inequities can transfer into power inequities that create a payoff differential. This
3

Hechter (1990) discusses group solidarity. However, his thesis extends to cooperation or contribution to a
collective good.
4
Baland and Platteau (1999) contend that the issue of heterogeneity is often confused with that of group
size. Small groups tend to be more effective in their monitoring and sanctioning capabilities because they
are more likely to be homogeneous.
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decreases incentive for participation in collective action and rule compliance (Boyce,
1994). Evidence suggests that social heterogeneity negatively affects collective action
(Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000; Bardhan, 2000; Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson,
forthcoming; Khwaja, 2000; Molinas, 1998). Community governance in the absence of
complete contracting relies on social capital. But socio-ethnic hostility and differences in
power decrease the level of trust, increase problems of asymmetric information, and
make regulation of collective action harder to monitor and hence less effective (Alesina,
Baqir and Easterly, 1999).
Wealth heterogeneity on the other hand, has been argued to have a beneficial
impact on cooperation, if users with larger endowments undertake the burden of
providing the common good (Baland and Platteau, 1999; Olson, 1965; Wade, 1989).
However, this result holds only under conditions of non-convexities such as fixed cost of
providing for the common good, when benefits are proportional to the cooperative effort
(Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson, 2000), if members with larger endowments derive returns
from the resource and these returns are decreasing in the level of extraction (Baland and
Platteau, 1996), or if there is a minimum threshold of cooperators and the mean level of
endowment of the group is low (Marwell and Oliver, 1993).
But even under these conditions, net benefits of inequality depend on the relative
magnitudes of contributions by the rich and poor users (Baland and Platteau, 1999).
Higher levels of inequality provide an incentive for those with larger wealth endowments
to contribute. Consequently, it provides a disincentive for poor users because their ‘stake’
in the common good is very small. Moreover, for a fixed amount of wealth, increasing
inequality causes some users to fall below the threshold amount of wealth thereby
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rendering them unable to contribute (Dayton-Johnson and Bardhan, 1996; Marwell and
Oliver, 1993).
Empirical evidence shows that wealth inequality has a non-monotonic
relationship with cooperation. Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson (forthcoming) find a Ushaped relationship with more equal distribution of wealth are more likely to experience
higher rates of conservation than those with an unequal distribution. They explain that as
inequality rises, the future claims of the poor users is small, they are less likely to
contribute and hence cooperation is low. But with very high levels of inequality the rich
users contribute irrespective of the actions of the poor users and hence cooperation rises.
The highest level of cooperation is achieved when wealth is equally distributed (and
hence the claims on the resource are equally distributed) or when there is perfect
inequality (when one person has claim to the entire resource).
Molinas (1998) however, in a study of 104 peasant cooperatives in Paraguay,
finds an inverted U relationship between inequality in endowments and cooperative
performance. He explains that in highly equal communities it is possible for a
coordination problem to arise since no single individual has a “differentiated incentive”
to organize cooperation. The situation changes when some individuals face a higher
return to cooperative behavior since it provides an incentive to organize. But when there
are very high levels of inequality, there is very low incentive for cooperative action due
to either the vested interests of the rich users to deter collective action for personal gain
or due to seasonal migration by the poor users, which undermines the sustainability of
any cooperative action undertaken by the community (Molinas, 1998)5.
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It should be noted that though the results obtained by Molinas (1998) seem contradictory to those obtained
by Bardhan and Dayton Johnson (forthcoming) and Dayton-Johnson and Bardhan (2002) the former study
the effect of heterogeneity on cooperation whereas the latter investigates the effect of heterogeneity on
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The important assumption underlying current theoretical and empirical literature
pertaining to the relationship of wealth heterogeneity and cooperation is that wealth is
synonymous with interest in the common good or resource, i.e., returns are increasing in
the level of wealth and decreasing in the level of extraction. The collective good is an
input into private production. When private wealth determines the level of production,
wealth and interest in the resource are aligned. The returns to the common good in this
case are increasing in the level of wealth and are decreasing in the level of extraction.
Hence with higher wealth, there is a higher incentive to contribute, i.e., interest in the
resource is high. However, when production is not contingent on the level of wealth as in
the case of use of the natural resource for non-commercial and subsistence purposes,
wealth and interests can diverge.
Wealth represents ability to contribute whereas interest represents incentives to
contribute. Interest may be thought of as the value of the standard increment in the
amount of good that is provided. It may be based on the desire for monetary gain, need
for interpersonal support and other subjective factors that motivate human beings
(Marwell and Oliver, 1993). While there is overlap in wealth and interest in the resource,
in that interests may be driven by socio-economic reality (Adhikari, 2002), recognizing
the differences between them is useful in constructing an empirical typology and in
designing public policies with regard to redistribution.

conservation. Moreover, it is likely that Marwell and Oliver’s (1993) claim that average wealth explains
whether inequality is beneficial to cooperation or not may explain the different results obtained.
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3. Data: Forests and People in the Middle Hills of Himachal Pradesh

Data were collected from 54 forest communities in 4 regions in the Middle Hills
(1000-2200 meters above sea level) of Mandi and Kangra districts in Himachal Pradesh,
situated in northern India in western Himalayas.
Classified forests in India are under the sole proprietorship of the state according
to the Indian Forest Act, 1927. However, Himachal Pradesh bears the distinction of being
the only state in which the traditional rights of the local people have been maintained in
various degrees under the colonial and post-colonial periods (Gadgil and Guha, 1995).
All households in a community6 share the same use and access rights to the forest. This
aspect of forest rights in Himachal Pradesh makes it conducive to use the IFRI7 definition
of user group or community as the unit of analysis. This definition does not require the
group to be a formal organization, be involved in collective action or have
institutionalized rules for collective decision-making. It thus allows for the analysis of
why groups with the comparable rights to resources differ with respect to collective
management of those resources (Poteete and Ostrom, 2003).
The economy of the surveyed communities is agropastoral and households
adopt a mixture of livelihood strategies due to the rough mountainous terrain and small
landholdings. Forests feature predominantly in everyday life, serving a multitude of
subsistence and livelihood needs. Many within the communities depend on the forest

6

The community in administrative terms may correspond to a village, hamlet, or a ward in a village. In
most cases however, it corresponds to the administrative village. The local usage of the term 'community' is
important because it pertains to use rights to the forest.
7
The International Forestry Research and Institutions (IFRI) research program engages in comparative
research on forests, institutions for forest management and people who use forest resources. IT uses the
user group as a basic unit of analysis; a user group is characterized as “a set of individuals with the same
rights and responsibilities to forest resources” (Poteete and Ostrom, 2003)
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critically due to low income and an inability to purchase substitute goods from the
market.
The forests in the middle hills of the regions studied can be broadly classified
into broadleaved forests in which the ban-oak (quercus incana) is the dominant species,
coniferous forests which are primarily chil (pinus roxburghii) and deodar (cedrus
deodara) monocultures, and mixed forests which consist of both coniferous and
broadleaved trees. Broadleaved forests have significant direct use benefits. These forests
provide a variety of trees, shrubs and grasses that provide fuelwood, charcoal, grass,
fodder, bedding for animals, food (wild vegetables and fruits), and wood for agricultural
and other implements. Moreover, ban-oak trees are evergreen and hence provide during
the cold winter months as well.
The coniferous forests on the other hand, are either pinus roxberghii (chil) or
cedrus deodara (deodar) monocultures. These provide fuelwood and timber but do not
yield fodder nor do the leaves of the trees make for good bedding for the animals. The
under story in these forests tends to be poor, thus reducing their value for grazing
purposes. The pinus roxberghii specie of conifers lead to forest fires in extremely dry
conditions and does not have good water retention capacity. Though conifers are very
profitable commercially, for timber8 (especially the cedrus deodara) and resin (the pinus
roxberghii), the Forest Department manages them as commercial ventures and the local
communities do not have a claim on them.
Collective forest management is not uncommon in these regions. Seventy-eight
percent of in the sample reported that they collectively managed their forests during the

8

Timber from the forests is managed by the state Forest Department. Each household has a timber
distribution (TD) right of one tree in 12 years subject to certain conditions. However, according to de facto
rules people are allowed to cut trees under special circumstances such as marriage and funeral. The Forest
Department largely respects this local custom.
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past ten years though only 63 percent still exist. Collective management takes the form of
meetings to discuss issues concerning the forest, and activities related to maintenance,
administration, forest protection and monitoring. Maintenance of the forest includes
regeneration of the forest such as planting trees and fencing parts of the forest.
Administrative activities involve meeting with forest officials on institutional matters,
forest protection concerns itself with fire fighting and prevention activities, and
monitoring involves ensuring that the rules set by the institution are not violated and that
violations are penalized. Communities may engage all or a few of these activities
depending on the perceived need for them.
External agencies (such as the Himachal Pradesh State Forest Department and
NGOs) have been encouraging collective management. Forty-five percent of the sampled
communities reported receiving some form of assistance from external agencies; 37
percent of these were established at the sole discretion of the external agency and the
remainder were established by community members and the external agency. Assistance
however, is not restricted to setting up the institution and helping to overcome the firstorder collective action problem. In some cases, it extends to decision making on
administrative and forest management, rule violation, and imposing fines on noncompliance.
With the aid of local administrators, NGOs and others familiar with the
regions, a sampling frame was determined consisting of communities that a) are situated
in the Middle Hills (1000- 2200 meters above sea level) regions of the four watersheds,
b) that do not engage in commercial extraction of forest resources, and c) are not conflictridden. Communities were chosen at random from this list. It is unlikely that this list was
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exhaustive though an effort was made to minimize selection bias. The data primarily
serve to test the theoretical assertions about heterogeneity and its implications.

4. Cooperation and its Determinants

The determinants of cooperation can be classified into five categories based on
work by Agrawal (2001), Baland and Platteau (1996), Marwell and Oliver (1993),
Ostrom (1990) and Wade (1988). These categories are resource characteristics, (forest
type, state of the forest, legal category of the forest), group characteristics (household
size, group heterogeneity), relationship between user and resource (dependence),
institutional arrangement and external environment (external intervention, nonfarm
income); they form the basis for the conceptual model (see Fig. 1).
One of the criticisms of CPR theory is that it defines outcomes as “success” or
“failures” which raises questions about its normativity (Steins and Edwards, 1999).
Therefore, the dependent variable, degree of cooperation (coop) is constructed by
applying principal components analysis (PCA) to characteristics of collective forest
management as practiced in the communities. These characteristics include the period of
existence of the institution, proportion of households that attend meetings, and the
presence of four forest related activities of forest maintenance, administration, forest
protection and monitoring.
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Figure 1: Causal Model

Group characteristics
-Group size
-Group Heterogeneity

External
Environment
-External intervention
-Non-farm employment

Institutional
Arrangements

Cooperation

-External Intervention

Relationship between
user and institution
-Dependence on forest

Resource
Characteristics
-Forest type
-Legal category of forest

The period of existence of the institution (exist) is indicative of the sustainability
of the institution and the turnout at the forest related meetings reflects the involvement of
community

members

(meetings).

The

institutional

activities

of

maintenance,

administration, protection and monitoring represent labor, time and monetary
contributions by the members. Given the constraints of the study period, it was not
possible to collect information on the manhours spent on each of these institutional
activities and hence each is represented as a dummy variable. Since these components
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constitute collective management of forest resources, they are correlated with each other
(see Table 1 for the correlation coefficients).

Table 1: Correlation Coefficients*
Existence

Meetings

Monitoring

Protect

Administration

Existence

1

Meetings

-0.17
(.21)

1

Monitoring

-0.40
(.002)

0.58
(<.0001)

1

Protect

-0.42
(0.002)

0.66
(<.0001)

0.89
(<.0001)

1

0.51
(<.0001)

0.46
(0.00)

0.43
(.001)

1

0.31
(0.02)

0.35
(0.01)

0.41
(.002)

0.62
(<.0001)

Administration -0.25
(0.06)
Maintenance

-0.24
(0.08)

Maintenance

1

* The figures in parentheses denote the p-values.

The PCA approach was adopted because each of the individual components
described here does not adequately reflect cooperation. For example, some communities
which do not hold meetings since forest-related rules are well-established and there are
few conflicts. In other communities, maintenance and administration are predominant
either due to their association with the Forest Department or if the forests are degraded
enough to justify efforts towards its regeneration.
The first principal component explains 0.57 of the total variation in the data. This
is used as the dependent variable, (coop); it represent the degree of cooperation that exists
with respect to forest management. The final construct (coop) is calculated based on
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scoring coefficients. The statistical procedure standardizes the variable and hence the
final construct, coop takes a value between -1.41 and 1.51, and has a mean of zero and a
standard deviation of one. Table 3 gives the factor loadings which shows how each
variable is correlated with the final construct.

Table 2: Correlation with Index of Cooperation
Components of Collective Management

Factor Loadings

Existence

0.66

Meetings

0.79

Monitoring

0.88

Protect

0.9

Administration

0.69

maintenance

0.59

In the sampled communities use and access to the forest are open to all in the
community and are not determined by wealth9. Hence, wealth and ability to contribute do
not necessary reflect interest and incentives to contribute to collective action. Thus. it
would be appropriate to treat wealth differently from interest. It also follows that
differences in wealth should be treated differently from differences in interest.

9

One could argue that wealthy users have access to better technology and hence can extract more. But this
is not the case for subsistence direct use consumption of forest products in Himachal Pradesh.
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Table 3: Variable Names and Descriptions
Coop
Hh
Social_heter
Socialsq
Wealth_diversity

Wdiversq
Interest_heter
Interest_diver
Outside
Outside_diver
Prop_nonfarm
Index_extint
Avgprop_use
Broad_f
Mixed_f
Legal_upf

The dependent variable. It is the index of cooperation as described
above. It is calculated based on the characteristics of collective
management of forests in the community.
It denotes group size and is the number of households in the
community
A proxy for heterogeneity in social identity. It measures the
probability that no two households belong to the same caste.
The square of social_heter.
A proxy for wealth heterogeneity and indicates ability to contribute
to collective management. It is calculated based on Greenberg’s B
index to measure diversity in landholdings of households in the
community.
The square of wealth_diversity.
An indicator for interest heterogeneity. Measures the diversity in
intensity of dependence on the forest across households in the
community based on Greenberg’s B index.
The interaction term between wealth_diversity and interest_heter.
Measures the conditional effect of the two variables.
An alternate indicator for interest heterogeneity. Measures
heterogeneity in outside options.
The interaction term between wealth_diversity and outside.
Measures the conditional effect of the two variables.
Measures the proportion of the population that has nonfarm sources
of income. It is a proxy for outside options.
It is the index of external intervention.
Measures the extent of dependence on the forest.
Dummy variable for broadleaved forests
Dummy variable for mixed forests.
Dummy variable for undemarcated protected forests. It denotes the
legal category of the forest.

Heterogeneity in social identity is proxied by social_heter. It measures the
probability that no two households belong to the same caste10. This measure is the inverse
of the Hirschman-Herfindahl concentration index (Laitin, 2000). Social_heter has a
mean of 0.26 (see Table 4) for the surveyed communities which means that on average,
74 percent of the community belongs to the same caste11. It is expected that if
heterogeneity in social identity makes agreement and sharing of the benefits and costs of
10

There may be other categories that people in these communities identify with such as occupation and
gender though these are not explored in this paper.
11
In other caste-based societies in India, caste is highly correlated with wealth and power. In the sampled
communities the correlation between wealth and social heterogeneity is positive and statistically significant
but low at 0.24.
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collective action much harder then social_heter will have a negative effect on
cooperation.
Wealth heterogeneity is calculated modifying Greenberg’s B index (Greenberg,
1956; Laitin, 2000) such that the wealth heterogeneity index equals:
wealth _ diversity = ∑ mn (mn)(rmn )

where M and N are any two landholding categories12, m and n are the proportions
of households in landholding categories M and N, and rmn is the weight assigned.
When M and N are the highest and lowest landholding categories, rmn takes the
value 2, otherwise it takes the value 113.
This variable may be considered endogeneous if better cooperation in forest
management leads to higher wealth. However, in the surveyed communities, land is
typically inherited and the market for land is quite thin. Hence it can be treated as an
exogenous variable.
Wealth_diversity has a positive effect if differential levels of wealth increase the
levels of contributions to the common good. This is hypothesized to be true when the
mean level of wealth is very low. However, if the mean level of wealth is high, then
increasing wealth heterogeneity can decrease ability to contribute and lead to lower levels
of cooperation. It is thus likely that wealth_diversity will have a non-monotonic
relationship with cooperation.
Heterogeneity in resource-dependence reflects heterogeneity in incentives to
contribute and hence it is used as an indicator of interest heterogeneity. This variable
interest_heter is constructed using Greenberg’s B index (see Laitin, 2000) based on three

12

Households in a community fall under one of the following landholding category: below 1 acre (10
kanals), between 1- 2.5 acres (10 and 25 kanals) and above 2.5 acres (25 kanals).
13
This is done in order to emphasize the difference between the lowest and highest landholding categories
and not treat them symmetrically.
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categories indicating the intensity of resource-dependence14. As with the measure for
wealth heterogeneity, the distance between the zero dependence and critical dependence
categories is weighted twice as much as the distance between the other categories in order
to emphasize the difference between the former. Heterogeneity in dependence can lead to
a divergence in preferences regarding resource management. This can lead to different
weights being attached to the future state of the resource and can influence the degree of
contribution or involvement in collective management (see Baland and Platteau, 1999;
Kant, 2000)15. Hence, it is hypothesized that this variable will negatively affect
cooperation.
The interaction term, interest_diver captures the effect of wealth heterogeneity
conditional on the existence of heterogeneity in dependence and vice versa. The effect of
this term is indeterminate a priori. The interaction term will positively affect cooperation
if ability to contribute influences interest in the resource. However, if there is a
divergence between ability and interest, then the interaction term will negatively affect
cooperation.
Outside and outside_diver are used as alternate indicators for interest
heterogeneity and its interaction with wealth heterogeneity. Outside measures
heterogeneity in the outside options of the community, in other words, heterogeneity in
the sources of employment that are accessed by the people of the community. Under the
presence of alternative employment opportunities, households and individuals have the
option of weighing returns from the resource relative to returns from the alternative
employment. This affects interest in the resource and changes the incentive to contribute

14

Households in a community were classified based on the intensity of dependence on the forest as:
proportion that are critically dependent, proportion that uses the forest but has access to substitutes, and
proportion that has zero dependence.
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to collective efforts to manage and conserve the resource. Lucrative earning opportunities
that fall outside the domain of the resource can significantly affect incentives to
cooperate, availability of labor and social cohesion within the community that promotes
cooperative behavior (Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson, 2000).
Outside is calculated as the probability that no two individuals fall under the same
category. Correlation between outside and social_heter, and wealth_diversity is not
statistically significant. A rise in this probability, i.e., in the heterogeneity of outside
options is expected to increase the divergence in the preferences and interests of those
who make up the community with regard to management and conservation of the forest
and hence it is expected to affect cooperation negatively.
Outside_diver is the interaction term between wealth heterogeneity and
heterogeneity in outside options. The effect of the interaction term is indeterminate a
priori. If land poor households are those with access to outside options, then it could
either increase cooperation if it implies that it increases the ability of the poor households
to contribute; if it implies that it decreases the time horizon of those with access to
outside options, it can decrease cooperation. If however, land wealthy individuals are also
the ones with access to outside options, it could negatively affect cooperation.
The economic contribution of environmental resources to the welfare of rural
households is highly significant (Cavendish, 2000; Jodha, 1995, 2002; Reddy and
Chakravarthy, 1999). Moreover, since communities use the forest predominantly for
subsistence purposes, it is expected that this use of the forests is likely to prompt
households to cooperate with each other to achieve better management and yield of these
forest products. Hence avgprop_use is expected to have a positive effect on collective
action.
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Table 4. Univariate statistics of the variables

Label

Variable

Mean

Std Dev

Min

Max

Coop

Index of cooperation

0

1.000

-1.407

1.505

Hh

Group size

85.852

115.731

17.00

550.000

Social_heter

Social heterogeneity

0.264

0.223

0

0.647

Socialsq

Social heterogeneity squared

0.119

0.125

0

0.418

wealth_diversity

Wealth heterogeneity

0.416

0.229

0

0.922

Wdiversq

Wealth heterogeneity squared

0.224

0.203

0

0.849

interest_heter

Dependence heterogeneity

0.304

0.260

0

0.936

interest_diver

Interaction between wealth
heterogeneity and dependence
heterogeneity

0.137

0.144

0

0.585

Outside

Heterogeneity in outside options

0.154

0.119

0

0.488

outside_diver

Interaction between wealth
heterogeneity and heterogeneity in
outside options

0.064

0.054

0

0.256

prop_nonfarm

Proportion with non-farm income

0.099

0.111

0

0.611

Index_extint

External intervention

1.036

1.621

0

6.000

avgprop_use

Average proportional use

0.485

0.265

0

1.000

Frequency For Dummy Variables
Label

Variable

Frequency

Percentage

broad_f

Broadleaved forest

9

16.46

mixed_f

Mixed forest

32

58.18

legal_upf

Legal category- Undemarcated
Protected Forest

17

30.91

The other variables are included in the regression analysis to control for their
effects on cooperation. Table 3 concisely describes the dependent and explanatory
variables used and Table 4 gives the univariate statistics for these variables.
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5. Econometric Results

Table 2 reports the econometric results. The variance inflation factors indicate no
multicollinearity with the exception of the squared terms. White's test and Breusch-Pagan
tests for heteroskedasticity were unsuitable for these data due to the large number of
dummy variables, but the LM and Q tests suggest constant variance16.
Social heterogeneity exhibits a U-shaped relationship with cooperation. It is highly
significant (at the 1 percent level) in specification 2 and mildly significant (at the 10
percent level) in the other two specifications. It suggests that cooperation is high when
the community is completely homogeneous and when its highly heterogeneous but
moderate levels of social heterogeneity are not conducive to cooperation. The turning
point for this quadratic function is 0.31 for the first two specifications and 0.3 for
specification 3.
Social heterogeneity is the probability that no two households in the community
belong to the same caste. When this probability is equal to zero, it implies that all
households in the community belong to the same caste and there is homogeneity in social
identity. Communication and interaction among households within the community is
likely to be high (or at least is not impeded due to social reasons); hence it is not
surprising that cooperation is high.

16

Since the dependent variable coop is censored, tobit models were run on the two specifications. The tobit
results were found to be similar to OLS results leading to the conclusion that data censoring does not pose a
problem. Hence the OLS results are equally valid and are presented in Table 2.
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Table 2. Regression Results
Dependent Variable: Coop
Specification 1

Specification 2

Specification 3

Intercept

-1.89***

-2.33***

-2.23***

Hh

-0.0001

-0.001

-0.0002

Social_heter

-2.94*

-4.51***

-2.98*

Socialsq

4.63*

7.34***

4.99*

Wealth_diversity

3.18*

5.99***

3.06

Wdiversq

-4.40**

-7.12***

-2.53

Interest_heter

0.94

Interest_diver

-3.72*

Outside

4.13

Outside_diver

-10.41*

Prop_nonfarm

-0.96

-1.21

-1.4

Index_extint

0.04

0.05

0.01

Broad_f

0.53

0.71*

0.69*

Mixed_f

0.37

0.33

0.53

Avgprop_use

2.66***

2.71***

2.58***

Legal_upf

0.80***

0.85***

0.71***

R2

0.68

0.74

0.72

Adjusted R2

0.582

0.64

0.61

F

6.96

6.93

6.55

***Significant at 1 percent level
**Significant at 5 percent level
* Significant at 10 percent level
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The problem arises when the community is composed of more than one caste
group. While caste based social inequities are less common in these parts of the country,
caste loyalty is a prominent feature which drives social interactions within communities.
At low levels of social heterogeneity (when the probability that two households do not
belong to the same caste is low), a majority of households in the community belong to
one particular caste group. While interaction among households from the majority caste
may be high, households from the minority caste groups may be viewed as 'outsiders'.
This could result in social discrimination and exclusion from the decision-making process
and hence lower participation in collective management process from the latter.
However, the statistically positive squared term suggests that a socially
heterogeneous community need not necessarily face lower levels of cooperation. When
the probability that two households do not belong to the same caste increases to more
than 30 percent, then cooperation is higher17. Cooperation is the highest when the
proportion of households across each caste is equal (i.e., when the community is
completely heterogeneous). This can be interpreted to mean that under such a case, the
possibility of domination by any one caste group is lower. This decreased ability to
capture power in the community perhaps increases the possibility of higher interaction,
higher communication and trust levels and hence higher levels of cooperation on issues
of common concerns such as forests.
The results show that social homogeneity is not a pre-requisite to cooperation
and that the inherent problem is not necessarily the degree of social heterogeneity but
what it implies for the marginal sub-groups in the community. High levels of cooperation

17
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In 50 percent of the sampled communities, social heterogeneity is higher than 0.3.

may be achieved in socially heterogeneous communities if exclusion and discrimination
are minimal.
Wealth heterogeneity shows an inverted U-shaped relationship with
cooperation. Wealth heterogeneity is measured by diversity in landholdings across
households in the community and is interpreted as heterogeneity in ability to pay. The
coefficients of wealth_diversity and wdiversq are mildly significant in specification 1,
highly significant in specification 2, and statistically insignificant in specification 3; but
the signs of the coefficients do change across specifications.
The results show that cooperation is low when there is perfect homogeneity and
perfect heterogeneity in landholdings across households in the community. In
specification 1, the highest degree of cooperation is exhibited at the turning point of 0.36.
Fifty four percent of the sampled communities are likely to increase cooperation as long
as the index of wealth heterogeneity does not increase 0.36. For the remaining 46 percent
of the surveyed communities that experience wealth heterogeneity greater than 0.36,
cooperation is likely to decline if heterogeneity increases. The highest degree of wealth
heterogeneity occurs when 50 percent of households in the community are in the lowest
and highest landholding category each.
The results suggest that for a fixed amount of wealth18 in the community, small
levels of wealth heterogeneity positively affects cooperation. So transferring wealth from
non-contributors to contributors increases the level of collective action. This supports
Olson's (1965) claim that inequality increases the level of provision of the collective
good.

18
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Land is used as a proxy for wealth; there is a fixed amount of land in each community.

However, the statistically significant squared term for the index of wealth
heterogeneity suggests that this holds only for low levels of inequality. When the index of
wealth heterogeneity increases above 0.36, cooperation within the community declines.
At very high levels of wealth heterogeneity, a significant proportion of the households in
the community is below a threshold level of wealth rendering them unable to contribute
to collective action. Households below this threshold are more likely to engage their labor
in activities that yield private gain, i.e., they are more likely to spend a higher proportion
of their time as migrant or casual laborers than in participating in collective action. Since
cooperation depends on labor contributions, this means that high levels of wealth
heterogeneity lowers the level of cooperation within the community.
Heterogeneity in resource-dependence, interest_heter which is an indicator of
heterogeneity in interests is statistically insignificant but its interaction with wealth
heterogeneity, interest_diver is negative and statistically significant at the 10 percent
level. Controlling for wealth heterogeneity, heterogeneity in resource-dependence does
not affect cooperation; the relative effects of interest heterogeneity do not statistically
explain the level of cooperation.
However, conditional on the presence of wealth heterogeneity, heterogeneity in
resource dependence, decreases the level of cooperation. The negative, mildly significant
coefficient of interaction between heterogeneity in wealth and resource-dependence
indicates that there is a divergence between ability to contribute and incentives to
contribute and this divergence decreases participation in collective management. This
means that when those with the highest incentives to cooperation (i.e., those who depend
of the resource) are not those with the ability to contribute, then cooperation is low.
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Under the presence of heterogeneity in resource dependence, wealth heterogeneity
maintains its U-shaped relationship with degree of cooperation but the turning point is
lower at 0.3419. This means that when wealth heterogeneity rises greater than 0.34,
cooperation starts to decline. Figure 2 uses the estimated coefficients of variables wealth
heterogeneity, heterogeneity in resource-dependence and the interaction term between the
two dimensions of heterogeneity to show the relationship of the variables with
cooperation. It shows the inverted U-shaped relationship between cooperation and wealth
heterogeneity and that under the presence of wealth heterogeneity, heterogeneity in
resource-dependence decreases the level of cooperation.

Figure 2: Plot of Estimated Coefficients of Wealth Heterogeneity, Interest Heterogeneity
and the Interaction between Wealth and Interest Heterogeneity
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The turning point is obtained by evaluating at the mean of dependence heterogeneity.

Specification 3 substitutes heterogeneity in outside options for heterogeneity in
resource-dependence as an indicator for interest heterogeneity. Under this specification,
the coefficients of wealth heterogeneity and its square become statistically insignificant
though the signs of the coefficients remain the same. The interaction term between
heterogeneity in wealth and outside options, outside_diver is statistically significant and
negative suggesting that conditional on the presence of wealth heterogeneity,
heterogeneity in outside options has a negative effect on cooperation, and conditional on
the presence of heterogeneity in outside options, wealth heterogeneity has a negative
effect on cooperation.
The coefficient of the variable avgprop_use is positive and statistically
significant. It suggests that with a rise in the absolute level of dependence on the forest,
the motivation to collective manage the forest is high and hence the level of cooperation
within the communities is also high. This implies that for policy purposes, community
based natural resource management is likely to succeed in communities with higher
dependence on the forest.
The signs of the other variables in the three specifications have the expected sign
that do not change with a change in specification.

7. Conclusions

Discarding the 'tragedy of the commons' framework in favor of a view that local
environmental issues are a problem of collective choice recognizes that communities are
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capable of creating and sustaining institutions related to natural resource management.
However, there is much to be learned about the characteristics of these communities and
how they affect cooperation. This paper focuses on one aspect of community (or group)
characteristics, namely heterogeneity. It shows that heterogeneity is not unidimensional,
that it has atleast three dimensions: wealth, social identity and interest in the resource.
While these dimensions can overlap they affect cooperation differently.
The quadratic relationship between social heterogeneity and cooperation implies
that the latter does not depend on parochialism. Socially heterogeneous communities are
capable of achieving high levels of cooperation subject to the condition that there are no
minority caste groups within the community. This suggests that when no caste group is in
a minority position, they are less likely to socially excluded or discriminated against, and
hence cooperation is high.
The quadratic relationship between wealth heterogeneity and cooperation suggest
that there may be an optimal redistribution level that can be undertaken in order to
achieve a higher level of cooperation. However, the negative interaction term between
interest and wealth heterogeneity suggests that ability to contribute need not coincide
with incentive to contribute; hence redistribution should be in favor of those who have a
higher incentive to contribute to collective management.
Contrary to Olson's (1965) claim of the “exploitation of the great by the poor”, the
“great” users are not necessarily those with higher levels of wealth but those who benefit
from and hence have an incentive to manage and conserve the natural resource. In the
case of forest resources, wealth and interests do not coincide. Those with higher levels of
resource dependence and lower access to outside options are likely to be the ones with a
higher level of interest. Resource dependent users who may be poor members of the
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community are likely to contribute much more in forest management than the rich
members of the community.
The results also suggest caution when implementing conservation-community
development schemes. The schemes that create or accentuate existing differences in
resource-dependence, access to alternative sources of income, and wealth can lead to
divergence in the preferences of members. Rather than being beneficial, such policies
could harm the objectives of forest conservation and community development.
Heterogeneity can thus have important social and ecological consequences and
understanding both its nature and effects can help in neutralizing the negative and
enhancing the positive (Schlager and Bloomquist, 1996). The complex nature of
heterogeneity calls for a greater attention to how members in the community interact with
each other given the socio-economic conditions and to the role of redistributive measures
in order to correct for past inequities as well to ensure the smooth working of local
institutions in maintaining and enhancing ecological and social well-being.
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